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Death of the Author: The Evolution
and Expansion of the Government
Edicts Doctrine in Copyright Law*
I. INTRODUCTION
Codification of the law is an expensive and time-consuming task that
requires a certain level of skill and an ability for quick turnaround of
product.1 Because of this, Congress and a majority of state legislatures
hire companies, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions, with legal
experts who organize legal information from a wide swath of sources
into masterfully-constructed annotations brimming with helpful
information to the reader.2 These annotations are so useful that the
federal and state judiciary often employ them to understand statutes
that are unclear or to define the scope of statutes.3 Moreover, these
annotations, due to the nature of the agreement with their respective
legislatures, even save taxpayers a great amount of money.4 If you are a
publication company, have an employer with enough capital to
purchase a subscription package with these publication companies, or
are an individual with expendable funds, there are little drawbacks to
copyrighted annotations. For many Americans, unfortunately, this
option is not so freely available.

* Thank you to Jacob Selph, Tammy Brack, Jackson Brack, Lily, Daisy, Luna, and my
friends for all that you endeavor to make life worth living. Thank you to David Brack,
Buddy, Hulk, and other loved ones for making life worth remembering. Thank you to
Professor Dave Oedel for your review of this Article, for your thoughtful insight into
intellectual property law, and for your kind words of encouragement (and your dog
Panda). Thank you to the Mercer Law Review Editorial Board for all assistance provided
with this Article, especially to Student Writing Editor Sandy Davis.
1 Ed Walters, Georgia v. Public.Resource.org: Ending Private Copyright in Public
Statutes, MEDIUM, (June 27, 2019), https://medium.com/@ejwalters/who-owns-the-law5e356ea5b5f8.
2 Id.
3 Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.,
906 F.3d 1229, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2018).
4 Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1522 (2020).
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Annotated copies of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.) and other statutes are often copyrighted and require
payment of several hundred dollars for access.5 Even with the
distribution of copies to libraries pursuant to the publication
agreement, these provided O.C.G.A. sets are often incomplete, outdated,
and require travel that might not be possible or feasible to everyone.6
Even if an individual can pay for annotated versions of statutes, the
websites on which these codes are accessed are coded in a manner, in
the facilitation of paywall restrictions, that hampers legal research and
prevents those who need to use accessibility software from reading the
annotated copies.7 If these annotations were more cursory, such results
could be more excusable, but the federal and state judiciary have shown
that this is not the case.
Federal and state courts give annotations the power to aid
interpretation and contextualization of the law, indicate which statutes
have been ruled unconstitutional or repealed, even though they are still
a part of the O.C.G.A., and have become a fundamental part of the
process of reading and understanding the O.C.G.A., other state codes,
and federal codes.8 Because of this, the annotations have been given
tremendous power as explanatory legal material to impact the law, and
many recognize that people reading the statutes without the

5 Stan Adams, Supreme Court Reminds States That Citizens Own the Law in Georgia
v. Public.Resource.Org, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://cdt.org/insights/supreme-court-reminds-states-that-citizens-own-the-law-ingeorgia-v-public-resource-org/.
6 Adina Solomon, Can States Copyright Annotations to Their Own Laws?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD
REPORT
L.P.,
(Aug.
22,
2019),
https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/articles/2019-08-22/can-states-copyright-annotations-to-their-own-laws;
Lindsay
Basye, Brendan Keefe, Georgia lawmakers fights to keep state laws off the internet¸
11ALIVE, (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.11alive.com/article/news/investigations/thereveal/ga-copyright-laws-us-supreme-court/85-4ebce978-2735-434f-93e8-06bd66a4f3f2.
7 Kelundra Smith, Law professors pen amicus brief in Georgia copyright case, GEORGIA
STATE NEWS HUB, (June 26, 2020), https://news.gsu.edu/2020/06/26/law-professors-penamicus-brief-in-georgia-copyright-case/; BRIEF OF 36 COMPUTATIONAL LAW
SCHOLARS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT at 9–11, Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150).
8 Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1512; Code Revision Comm'n for Gen.
Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1250–51; Kelundra Smith, Law professors pen amicus
brief in Georgia copyright case, GEORGIA STATE NEWS HUB, (June 26, 2020),
https://news.gsu.edu/2020/06/26/law-professors-pen-amicus-brief-in-georgia-copyrightcase/.
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annotations are at a significant disadvantage to understanding the laws
which govern their lives.9
This Comment analyzes the historical development of the
government edicts doctrine and the impact
Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc.10 has on the American people. Part II outlines
the development of copyright law, the government edicts doctrine, work
for hire doctrine, and statutory interpretation as they relate to this
recent evolution of copyright law. Part III explains Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc. in the United States Supreme Court, the
preceding district and appellate court decision on this case, as well as
prior case law discussing the government edicts doctrine. Part IV
discusses how uncopyrightable legislative works will impact groups
such as legal researchers, agencies, publishers, other states, those with
disabilities, future intellectual property lawsuits, and others under
purview of American legislatures.
II. THE FOUNDATION AND ADVANCEMENT OF THE
GOVERNMENT EDICTS DOCTRINE IN RELATION TO
GOVERNMENTAL WORKS
A. The Foundations of Copyright
The Constitution gives Congress the right to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”11 Through this, Congress created The Copyright Act,12
which allows copyright protection for “original works of authorship.”13
Copyright grants the holder the exclusive right to reproduce the work,
to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies of the work, to sell the
work, to perform the work publicly, or to display the work.14 Copyright
interests are given to the author of the work, so authorship is a
fundamental factor for a determination of copyright ownership.15

9 Adina Solomon, Can States Copyright Annotations to Their Own Laws?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD
REPORT
L.P.,
(Aug.
22,
2019),
https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/articles/2019-08-22/can-states-copyright-annotations-to-their-own-laws.
10 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020).
11 Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 8.
12 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2020).
13 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2020).
14 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2020).
15 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2020); Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906
F.3d at 1232.
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Copyright protection grants to the owner exclusive monopolization of
a work in the work’s respective market for at least several decades, with
the specific lengths varying dependent on the date of the copyright, the
author, and the lifetime of the author.16 An author can also transfer or
assign a copyright through a signed “instrument of conveyance.”17
Through the Berne Convention, an international treaty signed by the
United States in 1989, the works of authors are also protected
internationally in the other 178 countries that signed the treaty.18
Copyright protection was created to “promote the Progress of . . .
[the] useful Arts.”19 If individuals are guaranteed by the government
the right to hold a monopoly on their work in an economic market,
copyright proponents believe that those individuals will continue to do
so for economic incentive. These creators, recognizing the government’s
assurance of their solitary control over their work, will be able to block
free-riders and hold themselves out as the sole creators of a work on the
market. Through competition on the market the best creations will earn
the most revenue, incentivizing those artists to create more creative
content, thus “promot[ing] the Progress of . . . [the] useful Arts.”20 One
of the strongest criticisms of this reasoning is that the vulnerability and
high degree of risk involved in a new, non-market-tested work can
result in only slight variations of an already-proven successful product
to be marketed to the public. Regardless, other forces such as societal
drives for differing and new creative content ensure shifts in the Arts
promoted to the public.
B. The Creation and Evolution of the Government Edicts Doctrine
Wheaton v. Peters,21 an 1834 United States Supreme Court case, was
the first case which concerned the copyrightability of a government
edict.22 In this case, a court reporter wanted to establish a copyright on
court opinions that he had written through his occupation.23 The Court
determined that a court reporter did not hold a valid copyright claim to
a court opinion, and a judge is also unable to grant a court reporter this

17 U.S.C. § 302 (2020).
17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2020).
18 Circular 38A: International Copyright Relations of the United States. U.S. Copyright
Office (August 2020), https://copyright.gov/circs/circ38a.pdf.
19 Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 8.
20 Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 8.
21 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
22 Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1237.
23 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 593.
16
17
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copyright.24 The Court used the Copyright Act of 179025 and mentioned
that the court reporter was the author, but excluded an explanation as
to why the law was not eligible for copyright.26
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court gave reasoning to this
belief with its 1886 case Nash v. Lathrop,27 where a publisher wanted to
exclude a newspaper from publishing copies of judicial opinions in the
daily paper.28 On the question of “whether the [state] has an absolute
[copyright] in the opinions of the justices after they are filed with the
reporter,” the court held that the state could not because “justice
requires” free access to judicial opinions.29 The court stated that public
policy disallowed any suppression of this type, and immediate public
access to judicial opinions was an existing right of citizenry.30 The Nash
opinion focused mostly on this public policy concern rather than any
notion of authorship of the work.
The Supreme Court of the United States cited Nash as the rationale
for the holding in the case Banks v. Manchester,31 which also involved
judicial opinions.32 In Banks, a publishing firm under contract by the
state of Ohio via statute for the publication of Supreme Court of Ohio
judicial opinions sued an author who published the opinions in the
American Law Journal.33 The Court in 1888 determined that a state
judge or those under the judge’s direction also could not hold a
copyright despite the preparations of an opinion, the statement of the
case, the syllabus, and the headnotes.34
The Court reasoned that while a relationship existed between the
state and the judicial opinion, the Court was unable to answer who was
the proper author of the work.35 The Court could only identify that the
state could not qualify as an author, citizen, or any other descriptor of
an individual capable of receiving protection under copyright.36 The
Court stated that while judges are paid by the People at a fixed salary
and have no monetary interest in the opinions they write, the People
Id. at 668.
1 Stat. 124 (1790).
26 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 593, 667.
27 142 Mass. 29 (1886).
28 Id. at 29–30.
29 Id. at 34–35.
30 Id. at 35.
31 128 U.S. 244 (1888).
32 Id. at 254.
33 Id. at 245, 249.
34 Id. at 253–54.
35 Id. at 253.
36 Id. at 252–53.
24
25
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have paid into judicial opinions which grants them proprietorship.37
The court also emphasized how information that is binding to the public
should be available to them freely.38
A month later in 1888, the Supreme Court decided Callaghan v.
Myers,39 where a reporter appointed by the Supreme Court of Illinois
sold to a publisher court opinions and annotations that he prepared
while employed for the state.40 This publisher later sued another
publisher who had published the same reports; the other publisher
stated that the work was under the public domain because any work
done by the reporter was completed as part of his public duties.41
However, the Court disagreed, stating that while judges cannot produce
copyright while creating written work in their official capacity, a
reporter who prepares explanatory information should be able to
receive a copyright for the intellectual labor.42 The Court stated that he
could obtain the copyright as an author for the parts which he created,
but that he could not be an author as to judicial opinions because
copyright was not intended to grant the writer of a judicial opinion a
monopoly over the law.43 The Court also reasoned that since the state
government never objected to his sale of the work he did as a reporter,
not only did this suggest his ownership of the work, but this also
showcased that the state assented to his copyright of the work.44
Since Banks and Callaghan, Congress has codified the government
edicts doctrine on a federal level with 17 U.S.C. § 105.45 Meanwhile, the
Copyright Office stated through its Register’s Report that “[t]he
judicially established rule . . . prevent[s] copyright in the text of [s]tate
laws, municipal ordinances, court decisions, and similar official
documents,” which would extend the rule to include legislative works.46
The rationale behind the uncopyrightability of legislative codifications
derives from two tenets: a Lockean political philosophy that the citizens
of a nation (the “People”) are the source of all law of a nation through

Id. at 253.
Id.
39 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
40 Id. at 645–46.
41 Id. at 619–22, 645–47.
42 Id. at 647.
43 Id. at 647, 650.
44 Id. at 647.
45 17 U.S.C. § 105.
46 1961 Register’s Report, at 129–30.
37
38
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tacit consent,47 and a belief that the legislature are representative of
the citizens of a geographical area, which allows for the People to be the
“constructive authors” and owners of legal works, making such works
public domain and not capable of copyright protection.48
Lower courts have deliberated the expansion of the government
edicts doctrine. In Howell v. Miller,49 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1898 decided that the government
edicts doctrine also applied to state statutes.50 In this case, Howell
prepared a compilation of annotated judicial opinions and statutes for
which he later obtained copyright. The Michigan legislature contracted
Miller via statute to prepare a compilation of statutes, and Miller used
some of Howell’s work in the completion of this work.51 Howell sued
Miller for copyright infringement.52
The court stated that while the statutes and judicial opinion within
the compilation belongs to the state, Howell could still stop Miller from
publishing Miller’s compilation if Howell has a valid copyright.53 The
court held that a person can publish any statute and judicial opinion
found in Howell’s compilation without violation of the law, disregarding
any appropriation of Howell’s “labor and industry,” citing Banks and
Callaghan.54 While the court disallowed Howell to be the author of the
“public property” of statutes or judicial opinion, he met all the qualifiers
to be an author of the auxiliary information in the compilation due to
his labor and research.55
In 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ruled in Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc.56 that the government
edicts doctrine included model-building codes later adopted by a
municipality.57 The court held the building codes to be under the
government edicts doctrine on the principle that the law is public
domain, citing Wheaton, Banks, and Nash.58 The court emphasized the
47 Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1232; Alex
Tuckness, Locke’s Political Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Jan. 11,
2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/.
48 Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1232.
49 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898).
50 Id. at 137.
51 Id. at 130–32.
52 Id. at 132.
53 Id. at 136–37.
54 Id. at 137–38.
55 Id. at 138.
56 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002).
57 Id. at 796, 800.
58 Id. at 795–96, 800.
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foundations of popular sovereignty in its belief of a “metaphorical
concept of citizen authorship.”59 The court also acknowledged that
public policy demands that citizens be educated on the laws, have free
access to laws, and have the best capacity to influence future laws.60
The court also explains that, along with judicial opinions and
regulations, ordinances and statutes are also not subject to federal
copyright law through these guiding principles and the 1976 Copyright
Act.61
However, not all lower courts decided to extend the government
edicts doctrine. Lower courts deemed that the government edicts
doctrine was not applicable to privately-prepared data that states
mandated insurance companies follow or a privately-prepared system
that was published in the Federal Register and used as part of
government reimbursement.62 The government edicts doctrine was not
applicable to maps created by a county assessor or the terms of a town’s
restrictive covenant.63
In Lawrence v. Dana,64 an individual in the 1869 case published and
obtained copyright for a compilation of international law judicial
opinions with an introduction, annotations, and an appendix.65 The
United States Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts did not
question the copyrightability of this auxiliary information.66 In the 1928
case W.H. Anderson Company v. Baldwin Law Publishing Company,67
an author sued under copyright infringement for copying of the author’s
annotations and indices placed alongside a collection of the Ohio Code.68
While the Sixth Circuit facilitated a discussion of who of the two parties
actually wrote the annotations and thusly held copyright in the
annotations, a discussion regarding the annotations’ copyrightability
was not considered.69 In 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for

Id. at 799.
Id. at 799.
61 17 U.S.C. § 105; Id. at 796.
62 Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 518–20 (9th Cir. 1997);
CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 73–74 (2d Cir.
1994).
63 John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Properties, Inc., 322 F. 3d 26, 39–40
(1st Cir. 2003); City of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Sols., 261 F.3d 179, 193, 195 (2d
Cir. 2001).
64 15 F.Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
65 Id. at 45, 50–51.
66 Id. at 60–61.
67 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928).
68 Id. at 84.
69 Id. at 85–88.
59
60
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the Second Circuit held West Publishing Co. to not hold copyright to
annotations prepared in the compilation of judicial opinions. The court
viewed the selection and arrangement of facts for these annotations as
not displaying the minimal level of creativity necessary for copyright
protection.70
In 2017, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
issued Public.Resource.Org (in a separate action from the case at focus
in this Comment) a permanent injunction in 2017 for its publication of
technical and scientific standards written by private organizations that
were incorporated by reference in the Code of Federal Regulations.71
These standards, although written by private organizations, were
incorporated by reference by the Code of Federal Regulations and were
used for public safety regulation in products and practices across
America.72 These technical and scientific standards can value from forty
dollars to almost $10,000.73 The American Bar Association later passed
a resolution urging Congress to make regulations adopted by the
legislature available for free to the public.74

70 In order to maintain copyright over a work, the work must also be original and
possess some minimal level of creativity. These annotations held “subsequent procedural
developments” such as amendments and denials of rehearing, alongside parallel citations,
additional citations, and compilation attorney summaries. Rather than be held
uncopyrightable due to the author, the court viewed this compilation of data as
insufficiently creative because of its constraint to factual data and accepted legal
conventions. The majority found the selection and arrangement to be obvious and typical.
The dissent, authored by Justice Sweet, strongly disagreed, stating that the minimal level
of creativity necessary is rather low to pass copyright. Mechanical or routine presentation
of data such as an alphabetical listing of a phonebook is not sufficiently creative as its
compilation in this manner is “practically inevitable.” However, the dissent noted that in
this case, West was able to decide “a number of substantive, editorial choices—without
court direction or approval.” According to the dissent, West’s annotations required
independent and creative thought that was not controlled by the judiciary. Matthew
Bender & Co. v. Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 674, 677, 690–91 (2d Cir. 1998). See Feist
Publications, Inc., v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 358, 363
(1991).
71 Robert Ambrogi, Can A State Copyright The Law? SCOTUS Will Decide, ABOVE THE
LAW, (Jul. 1, 2019), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/07/can-a-state-copyright-the-law-scotuswill-decide/?rf=1.
72 Robert Ambrogi, In a Blow to Open Law, Court Upholds Private Copyright in Public
Safety Laws, LAWSITES, (Feb, 14, 2017), https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2017/02/blow-openlaw-court-upholds-private-copyright-public-safety-laws.html.
73 Id.
74Id.
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C. Work for Hire: An Agent for Authorship
Under the Copyright Act, if a work is a “work made for hire,” then
“the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author.”75 This can be negated if the parties agree
otherwise via a “written instrument.”76 The Copyright Act defines a
work made for hire falling under two criteria:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use
as a contribution to a collective work . . . as a supplementary work, as
a compilation, as an instructional text . . . if the parties expressly
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire. [A] “supplementary work” is a work
prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another
author for the purpose of . . . commenting upon, or assisting in the
use of the other work, such as . . . editorial notes, . . . bibliographies,
appendices, and indexes.77

These two differentiations apply depending on who made the work;
criteria (1) applies when a work made for hire was made by an
employee, whereas criteria (2) applies when an independent contractor
created the work.78 Although the terms “employment” or “employee” are
not defined within the Copyright Act, the Court in Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,79 inferred that common law of agency
applied given the term “scope of . . . employment” used in The Copyright
Act.80 A party’s right to control or acts of actual control over the other
party who created the work does not transform a commissioned work
into a work made under an employee-employer relationship.81
Under the common law of agency, a hired party is an employee if “the
hiring party [has a] right to control the manner and means by which
the product is accomplished.”82 Several elements can determine
whether an employee has the requisite control: “the skill required; the
source of the instrumentalities and tools; . . . the duration of the
relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right

17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2020).
Id.
77 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2020).
78 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 736 (1989).
79 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
80 17 U.S.C. § 101; Id. at 739–40.
81 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 750.
82 Id. at 751.
75
76
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to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired
party’s discretion over when and how long to work” among other
elements.83 If most of these factors are not met, the hired party will be
considered an independent contractor.84
Such a differentiation is significant for copyright ownership. If the
hired party is an employee, then the hiring party is the copyright
owner.85 If the hired party is an independent contractor, then the hired
party can retain copyright ownership or share copyright ownership with
the hiring party if both parties “intend[ed] that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”86
D. Statutory Interpretation: How Annotations Can Alter the Verdict
When differing interpretations of a statute are brought before a
court, a court can employ several differing theories of statutory
interpretation: textualism, purposivism, and intentionalism are the
most common. Textualism is a theory of statutory interpretation that
prioritizes the text of a statute and other intrinsic sources, such as
grammar, word choice, and context within the statute, over any other
extrinsic source, such as legislative history, the purpose of the statute,
and historical context.87 However, if issues arise with interpreting the
text, such as when the construction of the text is ambiguous or absurd,
some textualist judges will allow considerations of extrinsic sources to
solve ambiguity in the statute.88 Depending on the judge, a finding of
ambiguity is easily accomplished; ambiguity of a statute’s meaning is
defined by some courts as “capable of being understood by reasonably
well-informed persons in two or more senses.”89
Purposivism looks to the purpose behind the law or the goal behind
the enactment of the statute as the basis for statutory interpretation.90
While proponents of purposivism will consider and weigh heavily the
language of the statute and other intrinsic sources, they believe that an
analysis of the policy and legislative history of the text is also
fundamentally important in initial interpretation.91 Purposivism holds
that statutes are created in order to effectuate a purpose, and a court
Id.
Id. at 752.
85 Id. at 753.
86 Id.
87 State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45–52.
88 Id.
89 Id. at ¶ 47.
90 State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 561–63 (2003).
91 Id.
83
84
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should not attempt to divorce the meaning of the text from the context
from which the statute came to be.92
Proponents of intentionalism want to ascertain the intention of
Congress when enacting the bill as a basis of interpretation for a
statute.93 While some intentionalist judges will only consider the intent
of the legislature when the statute’s language is ambiguous,94 other
judges consider legislative history for statutory interpretation without
any determination of ambiguity in a statute.95 Finding the intentions of
the legislature is usually done through the consultation of legislative
history through reports or other documents which convey intent.96
Regardless of which method is employed by a judge for statutory
interpretation, there can exist the possibility for an analysis of extrinsic
sources to determine the meaning of a statute, especially if a court’s
interpretation of ambiguity is easily met.97 In federal courts, official
notes to statutes are often given “considerable weight” in determining
legislative intent.98 Federal courts have also recognized that
interpretations of statutes that are placed in the statutory notes are
also “nearly universally accorded great weight.”99
Georgia courts often utilize the annotations of the O.C.G.A. in
interpretation of its provisions as well. The Georgia Supreme Court has
stated that the “express intent” of the Georgia General Assembly in
creating a provision can be found in the O.C.G.A. comments.100 The
Georgia Supreme Court has also stated that the “legal effect” of a
provision and the scope of a statute could be found via an annotation.101
O.C.G.A. comments have been used to determine the purpose of a
statutory provision as well as to determine a statutory remedy.102
Through an employment of various theories, statutory interpretation
has a foreseeable impact on the meaning of a statute and a statute’s
effects on an individual. Through the court’s commonplace use of
annotations and comments in statutory interpretation, annotations
Id. at 570.
Travelscape, LLC v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 391 S.C. 89, 98 (2011).
94 Id.
95 United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93, (1985).
96 Id.
97 State ex rel. Kalal, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 47–48.
98 Stigars v. State, 674 A.2d 477, 483 (Del. 1996).
99 Horenkamp v. Van Winkle And Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005).
100 Jackson v. S. Pan & Shoring Co., 258 Ga. 401, 403 (1988).
101 Cox v. Fowler, 279 Ga. 501, 502 (2005); Prodigy Centers/Atlanta No. 1 L.P. v. T-C
Assocs., Ltd., 269 Ga. 522, 525 (1998).
102 Grace Bros. v. Farley Indus., Inc., 264 Ga. 817, 820 (1994); Quinn v. Cardiovascular
Physicians, P.C., 254 Ga. 216, 220 (1985).
92
93
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have the capacity to impact people’s lives and redefine the laws of a
nation or state’s citizens, although they are not legally binding.103
Despite annotations to a statute being seemingly inconsequential, their
repeated use by the courts to define and interpret laws have a profound
effect on the people.
III. GEORGIA V. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.: LEGISLATIVE
EXPANSION OF THE GOVERNMENT EDICTS DOCTRINE
A. The Development of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.
In 1977, the Georgia General Assembly created the Code Revision
Commission (Commission), comprised of “the Lieutenant Governor, four
members of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
four additional members of the House of Representatives, and four
members appointed by the State Bar of Georgia . . . one of whom is a
State district attorney.”104 The Georgia General Assembly enacted the
Commission to select a publishing firm to remodify and publish the
Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.), since the state had not published an
official state code since 1933. The Commission created fifty-three Code
titles for the O.C.G.A. as well as annotations for the Code, which the
Georgia General Assembly later enacted.105
The Commission in 2006 entered into an agreement with Matthew
Bender & Co. Inc. (Lexis) for the publication of the O.C.G.A., which
required the compilation of the statutes as well as the formation of
non-statutory annotations, including “judicial decision summaries,
editor’s notes, research references, notes on law review articles, [and]
summaries of the opinions of the Attorney General of Georgia . . . .”106
The Commission gave Lexis detailed instructions about what type of
annotations can appear alongside statutory text as well as specific
instructions for how Lexis could arrange the annotations.107
Lexis was required to summarize all published opinions from the
Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court, and any federal
case which involved Georgia statutes. Lexis was also obligated to
upload an unannotated version for free access to the general public. The
contract stated that the Commission, not Lexis, held control and final
approval over all material in the O.C.G.A., including the annotations,
Horenkamp, 402 F.3d at 1132.
Code Revision Comm'n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1352
(N.D. Ga. 2017).
105 Id. at 1352–53.
106 Id. at 1353.
107 Id.; Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1234.
103
104
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before enactment by the Georgia General Assembly. Lexis had the
exclusive right to publish and sell the O.C.G.A. in various forms, with
the Commission receiving any licensing fee royalties.108 The State of
Georgia held the copyright for all the copyrightable contents of the
Code.109
Public.Resource.Org, Inc. (Public Resource) is a well-known, free
publication site of the Supreme Court of the United States and United
States Courts of Appeals opinions as well as some state statutory
codes.110 Public Resource’s goal in the publication of this material was
to increase public access to legal information.111 Public Resource
purchased every volume and supplement of the O.C.G.A., posted the
scanned copies on its website, submitted copies to an Internet archiving
website, and gave electronic copies to individuals in the Georgia
legislature. Due to this action, and after several cease and desist letters
the Commission and the State of Georgia sued Public Resource in 2015
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
for copyright infringement.112
B. Previous Courts’ Rationale in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.
The United States District Court found for the State of Georgia,
stating that the O.C.G.A.’s annotations are copyrightable against Public
Resource.113 Judge Story noted that The Copyright Act lists annotations
as being a part of copyright protection and mentions W.H. Anderson Co.
and Lawrence as two cases granting copyright protection for annotated
cases and statutes.114 The court further observed that the United States
Copyright Office’s treatise states the copyrightability of annotations,
alongside its registration of other states’ annotated statutes, including
Texas and New Mexico.115 The court also used Callaghan, a 1888
Supreme Court case where a legal reporter’s annotations were
copyrightable intellectual labor, as rationale for its decision.116
Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. at 1353–54.
Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1234.
110 Id. at 1234–35.
111 Id. at 1234.
112 Id. at 1235; Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. at 1354.
113 Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. at 1361.
114 Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. at 1356. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; W.H. Anderson
Co., 27 F.2d at 85–88; Lawrence, 15 F.Cas. at 60–61.
115 Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. at 1356. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §§ 313.6(C)(2), 717.1 (3d
ed. 2014).
116 Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. at 1356. See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617,
647 (1888).
108
109
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Finally, although the entire O.C.G.A. contains both the statutory text
and its annotations, the district court stated that the Georgia
legislature did not enact the entire O.C.G.A. into law and is not binding.
The Georgia General Assembly had, with O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1, declared its
affiliation with a publisher in the production of annotations and with
O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7 affirmed that such annotations do not constitute part
of the law.117 After disregarding a defense of fair use by Public
Recourse, the United States District Court found for the State of
Georgia in 2017 and granted partial summary judgment.118
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
disagreed.119 Judge Marcus wrote that O.C.G.A. annotations are an
exercise of sovereign power and have legal effect, even if they do not
have the force of the law.120 The court stated that there are three
hallmarks to a law: “the identity of the public officials who created the
work, the authoritativeness of the work, and process by which the work
was created.”121 The court explained that if the work holds authoritative
power and is created by someone with authority, even if this authority
is assigned, through a process by which public officials normally
operate, then the work is authored by the People and belongs to the
public domain.122 In this case, the court stated that the annotations
were created through legislative authority, hold power to “explicat[e]
and establish[] the meaning and effect of Georgia’s laws,” as well as
following the process the legislature normally operates by presentment
and enactment by the Georgia General Assembly.123
The court of appeals focused on the term “authorship” through its
analysis of the O.C.G.A. annotations.124 The Eleventh Circuit intuited
that “authorship” usually determines the ownership of the work,
referring to the United States Code’s definition of ownership of
copyright (“[c]opyright in a work . . . vests initially in the author or
authors of the work”) where copyright will persist with the author
despite a lack of registration of the work.125 From this, the court
117 Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. at 1356–57. See O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1; O.C.G.A.
§ 1-1-7.
118 Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. at 1361.
119 Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1232.
120 Id. at 1232–33.
121 Id. at 1232.
122 Id. at 1232–33.
123 Id. at 1233.
124 Id. at 1236.
125 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at
1236. See Arthur Rutenberg Homes, Inc. v. Drew Homes, 29 F.3d 1529, 1531 (11th Cir.
1994).
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rationalized that in order to determine who owns the copyright, the
author must be recognized.126 With works that are produced by the
government, the author has been determined to be the People, barring
copyright.127
The court also took great inspiration from Banks and Veeck in its
rationale.128 The court stated that Banks created two rules: (1) works
created by courts as a part of official duties do not belong to judges, thus
calling attention to the manner in which works are created as to their
copyrightability, and (2) public policy demanded that these works be
uncopyrightable, thus shaping an argument that public policy can mold
the rationale for what should be copyrighted.129 This belief is noted by
the court as also being iterated in Veeck, which declares that popular
sovereignty creates public ownership of the law, which requires free
access to laws.130 The court also explained that the People are the
constructive authors of any judicial and legislative work, since
legislators and the judiciary are delegated by the People and are acting
on their behalf (popular sovereignty).131 Any work in which the People
are constructive authors is under the public domain.132
The court stated that while the annotations do not have any
authoritative power, they are “part and parcel” of the law and are
“inextricable” from it.133 The nature of the annotations are law-like in
who created them, the process of how they were created, and the “role
they play in the legislature and jurisprudential spheres of Georgia’s
public life.”134
Similar to Georgia law and Banks, the Georgia General Assembly
was the “driving force” of the annotations’ making.135 The connection to
the Georgia General Assembly was made through the Commission, “an
arm of the General Assembly,” who was funded and comprised
primarily of legislative members.136 Georgia law has also previously
described the Commission’s work as “legislative”.137 Since the
Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1236.
Id.
128 Id. at 1239–41.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1240–41; Veeck, 293 F.3d at 799.
131 Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1239. See THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
132 Id. at 1240.
133 Id. at 1243.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1243–44. See O.C.G.A. § 28-9-2 (2020).
137 Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Comm’n, 244 Ga. 325, 330 (1979).
126
127
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Commission was seen as an agent of the Georgia General Assembly,
and the Commission held ultimate control, supervision, final approval,
and an eventual vote over the work that Lexis created, the annotations
were seen as sufficiently similar in creation to a Georgia law.138 Other
United States Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit cases have also
allowed legislative immunity to groups that worked as a function of the
legislative body even though they were not a part of the legislature
themselves.139
Through application that the annotations were authored, tailored,
and adopted by the Georgia General Assembly, the court of appeals
reasoned that they were a work of the state government, and
“[c]opyright protection . . . is not available for any work of the United
States Government,”140 where “[a] work of the United States
Government” is defined as “a work prepared by an officer or employee of
the United States as part of the person’s official duties.”141 In Banks,
the information must be created by someone who has the ability to
promulgate binding works to the people.142 This is why, the court of
appeals argued, that Callaghan was not antagonistic to Banks, in
response to the analysis provided by the district court, which used
Callaghan as the basis in its opposing ruling.143 In Callaghan, the
individual was tasked with administrative duties rather than having
the power to promulgate law.144
While every work of the legislature is not copyrightable, the court of
appeals emphasized that the O.C.G.A.’s annotations have played a
tremendous part in statutory interpretation in Georgia laws.145 Courts
across Georgia have cited to the annotations of the O.C.G.A. as a
primary source to determine legislative intent, and the Supreme Court
of the United States has often used legislative intent in statutory
interpretation.146 The O.C.G.A. annotations, unlike other annotations,
carry with them the official state imprimatur and are interpreted by
Georgia courts as the authoritative source in understanding provisions
of the O.C.G.A.147 The court of appeals noted that Georgia courts
Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1243–45.
Id. at 1245.
140 17 U.S.C. § 105.
141 17 U.S.C. § 101; Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at
1245–46.
142 Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1246.
143 Id. at 1247; Code Revision Comm’n, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1356.
144 Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 646.
145 Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1248.
146 Id. at 1248, 1250–51.
147 Id. at 1249–50.
138
139
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through statutory interpretation have merged the annotations with the
statutory text to where the annotations are authoritative on the text.148
The O.C.G.A. also states that statutes are “merged with annotations” to
be published by authority of the state.149 This evolution lends to the
interpretation that the annotations are imbued “with an official,
legislative quality” and have combined as separate entities to become
one product or work.150
Finally, the court of appeals stated that the process in which the
annotations are adopted bears sufficient similarity to Georgia laws as
well to be comparable.151 The court ruled that the General Assembly’s
annual adoption of annotations carried the same key facets of the
process of a law.152 Given this annual adoption, the legal significance
that the annotations carry, and the annotations’ merger with the
O.C.G.A. to define Georgia Code, the court of appeals held that the
O.C.G.A.’s annotations were not copyrightable.153 The facets of the
annotations are “attributable to the constructive authorship of the
People” and belong in the public domain.154
C. The United States Supreme Court and Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc.
The Supreme Court of the United States followed the court of
appeals’ use of Banks to determine, under differing rationale, that the
annotations of the O.C.G.A. are not copyrightable, in Public Resource’s
favor.155 The Court, in a similar fashion to the court of appeals, viewed
the Commission as an arm for the Georgia General Assembly.156 The
Commission was viewed as part of the Georgia General Assembly
because the Commission was created by the legislature, did work in
service of the legislature, was primarily composed of legislators,
received funding from money allocated to the legislative branch, and
the final work product was approved and merged with the O.C.G.A.157
The Supreme Court evaluated the work Lexis provided as a “work for
hire” due to the control the Commission exerted over the annotations;
Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1248–49.
O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1.
150 Code Revision Comm'n for Gen. Assembly of Georgia, 906 F.3d at 1249.
151 Id. at 1255.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 1254–55.
154 Id.
155 Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1504.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1508.
148
149
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thus, the annotations were a work of the Commission.158 This rendered
the Commission, or through extension the Georgia General Assembly,
the “author” of the annotations.159 The Court also believed that the
annotations were a legislative duty because of, as the court of appeals
stated, the approval of the work.160
The Supreme Court of the United States differed from the court of
appeals in that the Supreme Court did not believe that a work carrying
the “force of law” was significant in comparison to the position of the
individual who creates their authoritative work as a part of their official
duties; while a judge’s work holds power as an authoritative legal work
due to the judge’s position, the same cannot be stated for a court
reporter.161 The Court held that as in Banks where “non-binding,
explanatory legal materials are not copyrightable when created by
judges who possess the authority to make and interpret the law,” so
should the same standard apply to “non-binding, explanatory legal
materials created by a legislative body vested with the authority to
make law.”162 The Court applied the rationale of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court case Nash v. Lathrop as evidence that judicial opinions
and statutes are equal in measure for purposes of the government
edicts doctrine, thus allowing the equivalence of judges and legislators
in this manner.163 Works created by government officials who lack the
authority to make or interpret the law are not under the government
edicts doctrine.164
Georgia argued that the Copyright Act specifically listed
“annotations” as a work that is eligible for copyright protection.165
However, the Court countered that this definition was insufficient due
to a distinction of the “author.”166 While annotations are allowed for
copyright if they are “original work[s] of authorship,” the Court
countered that this was not applicable because under the government
edicts doctrine, judges and legislators are not “authors when they
produce works in their official capacity.”167

Id. at 1505, 1508.
Id.
160 Id. at 1509.
161 Id. at 1506–07.
162 Id. at 1504 (emphasis removed).
163 Id. at 1507; Nash, 142 Mass. at 35.
164 Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1507.
165 Id. at 1509.
166 Id.
167 17 U.S.C. § 102; Id. at 1509.
158
159
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Georgia also argued that the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office
Practices (Compendium) preserved Georgia’s argument.168 The
Compendium states that “the Office may register annotations that
summarize or comment upon legal materials.”169 The Court responded
by remarking that the Compendium is only persuasive authority as well
as noting that this argument disregards the author of the material.170
The Court countered that the Compendium also states, in reference to
the significance of the author, that “[a]s a matter of longstanding public
policy, the U.S. Copyright Office will not register a government edict
that has been issued by any state, local, or territorial government,
including . . . types of official legislative materials.”171
Georgia also contended that such a decision would be harmful for the
production and dissemination of the O.C.G.A., which runs counter to
the Copyright Act’s overall purpose of promoting such actions.172
Georgia argued that ruling in Public Resource’s favor would cause
many states to “be unable to induce private parties like Lexis to assist
in preparing affordable annotated codes for widespread distribution.”173
The Court responded that Congress, not the judiciary, is the proper
forum “to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”174
After responding to both Justice Ginsburg’s and Justice Thomas’s
dissents, the Court argued that public availability of the O.C.G.A.’s
annotations is in Georgia citizens’ best interest.175 Without annotations,
a free version of the Georgia Code also does not outline which statutes
are overruled by the Georgia Supreme Court that the legislature has
not narrowed or repealed.176 After this, the Court affirmed the
judgment of the Eleventh Circuit.177
D. Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.: Thomas’s Dissent
In the first of two dissents, Justice Thomas, Justice Alito, and Justice
Breyer took issue with the expansion of the government edicts doctrine,

Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1510.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES § 313.6(C)(2)(rev. 3d ed. 2017).
170 Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1510–11.
171 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES § 313.6(C)(2)(rev. 3d ed. 2017); Id. at 1511.
172 Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1511.
173 Id.
174 Id.; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003).
175 Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1509, 1511–12.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1513.
168
169
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the argued expansion of the Copyright Act, and the effects the law will
have upon the “22 [s]tates, 2 [t]erritories, and the District of Columbia”
who employ a similar agreement for the production of annotated
codes.178 After reviewing the facts, court analysis, and holdings of
Wheaton and Banks establishing that judicial opinions cannot be
copyrighted, the dissent, through the use of Callaghan, articulated that
notes prepared via an official court report are still copyrightable even
when published with the uncopyrightable judicial opinions.179
The dissent stated that these previous decisions were uncritically
examined by the majority to receive an incorrect conclusion.180 The
dissent added that an incorrect application of the term “author” was
used, in that Banks and the Copyright Act were not considering a judge
as an “author” similarly to a writer of novels or musicals. 181
Historically, in England judges were not considered authors.182 The
dissent responded that, based on precedent, the Court should not have
placed consideration on authorship; instead, the Court should have
focused exclusively on whether a particular work has the force of law.183
The majority responded to this argument of the dissent by countering
that this exclusion of authorship held multiple problems.184 The
majority opinion stated that a lack of consideration on the identity of
the author does not match the rationale used in previous Supreme
Court cases, naming Wheaton and Banks.185 Banks considered and
disallowed copyright protection for “headnotes and syllabi produced by
judges,” although these materials did not carry the force of law.186 The
majority held that the Court should primarily consider who the author
is, whether this author carries the force of law, and whether this author
was acting in an official capacity when creating this work, not whether
the work carries any force of law.187 While the dissent argued that the
author should not be considered, the majority countered that the
Copyright Act focuses on the author through the “authorship”

Id.
Id. at 1514–15.
180 Id. at 1515.
181 Id. at 1515–16.
182 Id. at 1516.
183 Id. at 1515.
184 Id. at 1511.
185 Id.
186 Id.; Banks, 128 U.S. at 253.
187 Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1512.
178
179
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requirement, and other Supreme Court cases have made
differentiations on copyrightability based on whom the author was.188
The dissent also asserted that a worry about fair notice may have
been the true motivator for the Court’s holding rather than the cases
themselves.189 The dissent expressed that this concern is unwarranted
because the annotations are not law and “do not even purport to
embody the will of the people.”190 They only serve as a summary and
consolidation of legal information.191 The dissent also argued that the
Copyright Act supports this interpretation due to a lack of definition of
the term “author,” no mention of state employees is made in the
government edicts doctrine, and the mention of annotations as
copyrightable derivative works.192
The Georgia General Assembly expressly stated that the annotations
were not binding through O.C.G.A. § 1-1-1 and O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7, and
although the materials appear in the same code, there is little confusion
for the reader as to which material is the Code and which material
serves as commentary.193 The annotations also do not enter the same
process of bicameralism and presentment necessary to become a law in
Georgia.194 The creation of the annotations was also more synonymous
to other copyrightable material such as books and music because,
unlike judicial opinions, the creation of annotations is motivated by
copyright laws to create a product that will earn revenue.195 The dissent
remarked that an individual who wishes to find information regarding
Georgia statutory law changes can look through court decisions rather
than be dependent on one tool to access the same factual information.196
Finally, Justice Thomas’s dissent finds flaw with the application of
the majority’s holding. Almost all jurisdictions with annotated codes
employ contractors that are supervised by legislators or the judiciary.197
“Many [s]tates, private parties, and legal researchers” are affected by
this holding, possibly causing the cessation of an annotated version.198
Via its contract, the O.C.G.A. allowed creation of an annotated version
188 Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1512. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; Banks, 128 U.S.
at 253; Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 647.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 1517.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 1518.
193 Id. at 1517.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 1521.
198 Id. at 1522.
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to sell that is markedly less expensive than other annotated codes on
the market for the O.C.G.A.199 “Lexis sold the O.C.G.A. for $404 in
2016, while West Publishing’s competing annotated code sold for
$2,570.”200 Through the majority’s decision, the majority’s initial fear
that the law was less accessible to people may have been truly
realized.201 The dissent ended by stating that the People should be able
to take to Congress to alter the Copyright Clause in their best
interest.202
E. Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.: Ginsburg’s Dissent
Justice Ginsburg authored the other dissenting opinion, which
Justice Breyer joined, to state that the O.C.G.A. annotations are not an
act of the legislature.203 Rather than detract away from the role of the
“author,” this dissent believed that a legislator’s annotations can be
copyrightable versus a judge’s due to the difference of the role.204 While
the judiciary is tasked with interpreting and applying the law, the
legislature makes laws.205
The dissent argued that the O.C.G.A. annotations are not a part of
the lawmaking process to count as works of the legislature.206 The
legislature did not create annotations and statutes concurrently, and
the annotations only serve as comments to statutes that are already
passed; “annotating begins only after lawmaking ends.”207 The
annotations also only serve to describe a law, rather than prescribe any
action as a law written by a legislator does.208 Finally, the O.C.G.A.
stated that annotations are present only as a convenience or aid for the
reader.209 Because of these reasons, the dissent ended by stating that
the O.C.G.A. annotations cannot be considered works of the legislature
and should not be copyrightable.210
The majority opinion also responded to the dissent’s argument that
annotations are not “authoritative explanations of the law” and work

Id.
Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1523.
204 Id. at 1515, 1523.
205 Id. at 1523.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 1523–24.
209 O.C.G.A. § 1-1-7; Id. at 1524.
210 Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1524.
199
200

680

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

only as a summarization and comment of other law.211 The majority
retorted that a lack of authoritative explanation of the law does not
place a written work “outside the exercise of legislative duty by the
Commission and legislature.”212 The majority opinion countered that
even though statements of the case or syllabi lack an authoritative
explanation of the law, these works are still under the government
edicts doctrine because the judges did the work within their official
capacity.213 The majority did not directly address the delineation
Justice Ginsburg made between the work of the legislator and the
creation and role of the annotations.214
IV. BENEFITS OF THE EXPANSION OF THE GOVERNMENT
EDICTS DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court reached the correct holding in Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc. through its analysis of the annotation’s
author and the annotations’ power in Georgia courts. As the Supreme
Court and the Eleventh Circuit determined, statutory annotations hold
significant power over courts’ statutory interpretation and are a
necessary aid for citizens to understand their rights. Though changes to
public access to state statutory annotations may seem of small effect,
this change benefits a multitude of people and professions, as well as
possibly increasing public access to other information promulgated and
enforced by the government. Although changes may occur to the
procedure of governmental departments and to annotations’ creation,
this change can either be remedied or is slight in comparison to the
benefit of increased access to statutory annotations. The sections below
denote the benefits and just results of this ruling, as well as possible
issues that may arise and how those issues can be diminished.
A. Increase of Access to Legal Information to the Public
The greatest boon from the Supreme Court’s decision for the People
is the increase in access to legal information for the citizenry. For the
populace, this is “a cause to celebrate;” an allowance for free access to
these annotations allows a deeper understanding of the laws which
govern their lives.215 Annotations contextualize the law and are often
Id. at 1509, 1523–24.
Id. at 1509.
213 Id.
214 See id. at 1523–24.
215 Adina Solomon, Can States Copyright Annotations to Their Own Laws?, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT L.P., (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/articles/2019-08-22/can-states-copyright-annotations-to-their-own-laws.
211
212
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used by federal and state courts in interpretation of the law.216 Access
to the law and information which has great power on the law is not only
beneficial, but also expected and fundamental to the right of citizens
expected to comply with these laws where “ignorance of the law is no
excuse.”217 “[I]t’s difficult to imagine the people who fought a war
against a Star Chamber monarchy meant for this power to allow state
governments to keep people in the dark about the law.”218
By allowing Georgia citizens access to annotations, Georgia residents
are no longer subject to the “economy-class” version of the O.C.G.A. that
never denoted unconstitutional and unenforceable statutes that had not
been removed from the current Code.219 By gaining access to the
“first-class” O.C.G.A., readers will be able to see what limits,
restrictions, and freedoms apply to them and it does not subject the
reader to less rights for the inability or unwillingness to purchase the
premium product.220 Although the Court believed no nefarious action
was done, it is cognizant that an unjust result occurred.221
Before this ruling, these annotations could only be accessed via
purchase of an annotated copy for several hundred dollars, an attempt
to find a library with a current copy, or payment to use Lexis, thus
raising further concerns about having to agree to extensive terms that
implicate an individual’s privacy.222 Before the Supreme Court’s
216 Kelundra Smith, Law professors pen amicus brief in Georgia copyright case,
GEORGIA STATE NEWS HUB, (June 26, 2020), https://news.gsu.edu/2020/06/26/lawprofessors-pen-amicus-brief-in-georgia-copyright-case/.
217 Stan Adams, Supreme Court Reminds States That Citizens Own the Law in Georgia
v. Public.Resource.Org, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://cdt.org/insights/supreme-court-reminds-states-that-citizens-own-the-law-ingeorgia-v-public-resource-org/.
218 A Star Chamber court was an English court for the upper class that was viewed by
many during its use to be arbitrary, subjective, mismanaged, and an instrument of
oppression by royalty. The court was often used by English royalty to convict political
opponents and to suppress those who acted or spoke unfavorably of the actions of the king
until its abolishment in 1641. Stan Adams, Supreme Court Reminds States That Citizens
Own the Law in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY &
TECHNOLOGY, (Apr. 30, 2020), https://cdt.org/insights/supreme-court-reminds-states-thatcitizens-own-the-law-in-georgia-v-public-resource-org/.; The Editors of Encyclopaedia
Britannica, Star Chamber | Definition, History, & Facts. BRITANNICA. (Sep. 27, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Star-Chamber.
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holding, a news station in Atlanta attempted to gain access to a current
annotated version of the O.C.G.A. through the legislative council, who
directed the station to visit a library if they did not want to pay several
hundred dollars.223 After visiting three branches of the Fulton County
Public Library, including the main branch directly across from the
Georgia Capitol, the investigator found that none of the libraries held a
complete current set, and some volumes were six years out of date.224
An amicus brief also raised concerns about the O.C.G.A.’s
inaccessibility for those with disabilities.225 For those who are unable to
physically travel to a library, they will be unable to access legal
materials without paying for a subscription or a copy of the O.C.G.A.
Other individuals with disabilities require the use of assistive
technology such as screen reading software. Since the law is
unavailable online and is hosted on a site that is not sufficiently open to
allow such software to work, then these individuals are unable to use
such technology. The brief cites a study of individuals with these needs
having difficulty reading and utilizing legal materials, as well as noting
how Lexis is currently not available for people with these disabilities.
Public Resource created a database for the O.C.G.A. that was accessible
to those who use assistive technology.226 With this copyright displaced,
those with disabilities will have better access to the law.
Prior to this decision, some feared that those who were unable to
purchase a subscription with Lexis or who were unaware of the
annotations would be unable to access “the state’s own explanation and
analysis of the law in which the state’s citizens are expected to
abide.”227 Such greater access also allows those who frequently utilize
annotations such as educators, students, librarians, journalists,
historians, and any lawyer or legal educator unable to afford Lexis to
have access to the “state’s interpretation of the law” and have a greater

223 Lindsay Basye, Brendan Keefe, Georgia lawmakers fights to keep state laws off the
internet¸ 11ALIVE, (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.11alive.com/article/news/investigations/thereveal/ga-copyright-laws-us-supreme-court/85-4ebce978-2735-434f-93e8-06bd66a4f3f2.
224 Lindsay Basye, Brendan Keefe, Georgia lawmakers fights to keep state laws off the
internet¸ 11ALIVE, (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.11alive.com/article/news/investigations/thereveal/ga-copyright-laws-us-supreme-court/85-4ebce978-2735-434f-93e8-06bd66a4f3f2.
225 Brief of Amici Curiae Next-Generation Legal Research Platforms and Databases
and Digital Accessibility Advocate In Support of Respondent at 9–11, Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) (No. 18-1150).
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swath of information for research.228 The American Association of Law
Libraries and other library associations filed an amicus brief stating
that libraries need the government edicts doctrine for access and
preservation of legal materials.229
A deeper understanding of a law, while beneficial, shrinks in
comparison to the paramount importance of the annotations’ power as
explanatory legal materials to determine how a statute is
interpreted.230 Both federal and Georgia courts utilize the annotations
provided with their respective codes as a guide for interpretation,
allowing the annotations to hold the statute’s true meaning.231 Given
the power that annotations hold in the determination of the laws, free
access to this information gives citizens a much greater chance of
understanding their rights.
Many individuals often choose to represent themselves in court for
family law matters, wills and estates, or other sectors of the law when a
lawyer would be too expensive or time-consuming to consult or hire.232
These numbers are expected to continue to rise, especially in family law
cases.233 While an individual may search and read the relevant statutes,
an inability to consult annotations may lead to an incorrect
interpretation already resolved by the courts or to not consider other
legal data such as cases present in the annotations. Such a lack of
access to explanatory information used by the federal and Georgia
courts places that party at a great disadvantage; it “can make the

228 Adina Solomon, Can States Copyright Annotations to Their Own Laws?, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT L.P., (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/beststates/articles/2019-08-22/can-states-copyright-annotations-to-their-own-laws;
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(Aug.
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2019),
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229 Brief of American Library Association, Association of College and Research
Libraries, Association of Research Libraries, and the American Association of Law
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140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020) No. 18-1150); Thomas Baer, SCOTUS Rules “No One Can Own The
Law” – Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., JENKINS LAW LIBRARY, (May 7, 2020),
https://www.jenkinslaw.org/blog/2020/05/07/scotus-rules-no-one-can-own-law-georgia-vpublicresourceorg-inc.
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difference between winning and losing a case.”234 With this ruling, these
people have a better understanding of the law.
B. Benefits to Computational Analysis of Legal Information
A greatly unconsidered but intriguing impact of Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc. is the effect that the ruling will have upon
computational analysis of legal information. Researchers at Georgia
State University School of Law and many other law schools use
computational analysis with legal information for the prediction of case
outcomes and the identification of biases in rulings; this holding is
greatly beneficial to their studies. Paid platforms greatly inhibit their
research due to downloading restrictions and other limits. Other
researching sites such as Westlaw or Bloomberg also place limits on the
information displayed. Computational legal scholarship requires access
to digital versions of codes; previously, annotations were privy to the
restrictions of paid platforms that do not exist for free platforms. With
full free access to statutory code, legal researchers, historians, and
courts can more easily utilize computational methodologies to their
benefit.235
However, other researchers have indicated trepidation that this
ruling is beneficial for legal research. The Software & Information
Industry Association (of which Lexis is a member) filed an amicus brief
stating that a ruling for Public Resource would likely hamper
investment of law-related works, inhibiting innovation within the legal
research community.236 However, this argument seems to be structured
in a belief that an alternative deal for the creation of annotations is
improbable, especially any scenario in which the state legislature is not
in control of the work product.
C. Increased Supervision on Other Governmental Work-Product to
Protect Copyrightability
If, during their official capacity, legislators create a work on their
own or via a work for hire, then that work is uncopyrightable under the
government edicts doctrine as a result of Georgia v.

Id.
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Public.Resource.Org, Inc.237 Any individuals or companies concerned
with copyright that create government materials will have to keep
watch as to whether their work will be used by a lawmaking official or
body in an official capacity, as well as consider if their work could be
used for a legislative activity.238 Government entities should also
evaluate if activities they employ have “quasi” legislative or judicial
functions that could be evaluated as an action of the legislature or
judiciary.239 Concerns could also arise with works created by private
parties for municipalities and counties.240
This new need for supervision is not too strenuous of a task for these
governmental bodies. The public policy benefit to access of information
created in an official capacity by the legislature or judiciary is far
greater than an internal check to ensure that information would be
copyrightable. If this information is being used in a manner that binds
the citizenry, such as governmental adoption of building codes or
regulations, there is a strong public benefit to having this information
be publicly accessible. Demanding a citizen to be bound to governmental
materials which are not publicly available–materials which must be
bought to be accessed–disallows that individual from a fundamental
right to the law.241 Moreover, not all works created by the government
are under the government edicts doctrine. Governmental works

237 Jeffrey Cadwell, Copyright Lawyers on SCOTUS Decision in Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org: Expected, But Possibly Problematic, IPWATCHDOG, (Apr. 29, 2020),
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prepared for non-legislative or non-judicial officials, offices, or uses have
copyright protection.242
D. The Necessary Alterations to Other State Statutes
As noted in Justice Thomas’s dissent, twenty-five other jurisdictions
claimed copyrights on their official code annotations, affecting nearly
half of the states of the United States.243 Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and the District of Columbia all
filed an amicus brief for Georgia in the case.244 All of the twenty-five
regions which employ an annotation method for their Codes similar to
Georgia will now have to re-evaluate and alter the structure of their
publishing agreements.245 As previously discussed, the work which will
have to be employed to restructure these deals are a necessary cost if
done in the protection of the People’s right to annotations. A necessity
of a right should not hinge on the possibility that state bodies and
corporations will have to restructure contract negotiations.
E. A Worried End to Annotations and Its Possible Solutions
The strongest rebut to the majority opinion, especially after the
opinion espouses so many public policy sentiments, was Justice
Thomas’s concern that individual states will, as a result, cease in the
production of annotated codes.246 He hypothesizes that, because the
state will no longer be able to receive an annotated version of the
O.C.G.A. via a government contract for a much lower price ($404) than
the other competing annotated code ($2,570), the O.C.G.A. might
become less accessible and expensive than before.247

242 Jeffrey Cadwell, Copyright Lawyers on SCOTUS Decision in Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org: Expected, But Possibly Problematic, IPWATCHDOG, (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/04/29/copyright-lawyers-scotus-decision-georgia-vpublic-resource-org-expected-possibly-problematic/id=121163/.
243 Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 1513; Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org,
PRIVACY
INFORMATION
CENTER,
(Apr,
27,
2020),
ELECTRONIC
https://epic.org/amicus/public-access/publicresourceorg/.
244 Ross Ufberg, Can You Copyright the Law…ish?, BERKLEY TECHNOLOGY LAW
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Concerns also arise that taxpayers will have to pay several million
dollars for Georgia to create annotations.248 Other lawyers share Justice
Thomas’s concern and worry that if states are not willing to pay extra
for annotated versions of their respective codes, then publishing
companies will have no financial incentive to continue making
annotations, and the public will no longer have access to this valuable
information that can be essential for statutory interpretation.249 Some
lawyers state that if copyright protection is absent and freely available
for use, no reputable company will be willing to write them.250
Other lawyers have noted that through the publication agreement
with Lexis, Georgia had in place barriers for how much Lexis could
charge ($404) and requirements for Lexis to provide copies to some
libraries, universities, and government buildings in Georgia.251 Without
these barriers in place, any annotated law that is eventually produced
will be far less accessible to Georgia’s citizens.252 Other states argued
that, with curated control over who creates the annotations, states can
prevent unsolicited third parties from publishing incorrect statutory
language to the detriment of the people of Georgia.253 They believe that
Congress, as mentioned by the Court and Justice Thomas’s dissent, will
be the best solution to these possible issues.254

248 See Adina Solomon, Can States Copyright Annotations to Their Own Laws?, U.S.
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However, this envisioning fails to consider any possible alternative
agreements that Lexis can make with a state body to retain most of the
benefits found in the original agreement. This viewpoint articulates
that Lexis holds such tremendous value in the copyright, as opposed to
payment for only the creation and distribution, that a lack of
copyrightability will disallow any alternative structure. This prediction
also eliminates any possibility that the price of these agreements will
still remain reasonably low if companies bid for the value of the
creation and distribution agreements future states will offer to
publishing companies.
One possible solution could be a state-funded or state-affiliated
organizations where legislators do not hold so much control over the
creation of the annotations, lending them not a work-for-hire.255
However, this does not address all the concerns that Georgia presented.
Another consideration is that Lexis and other similar platforms already
have a client-base that expects annotations when using their product,
establishing an economic incentive to continue creating annotations.
Lexis was not producing any revenue via the creation of Georgia’s
annotations, and much of the material that they were already offering
(statutes and cases) are uncopyrightable.256 Lexis derives revenue from
the ease of access and the quick searchability of the law, rather than
access to copyrighted material.257 Moreover, private publishers still
have the “ability to create, copyright, and sell annotated versions of
legal codes,” but just not official works made by those in the judiciary or
legislature while in their official capacities.258
The best solution to this issue would be for Georgia to enter into a
license agreement with Lexis instead of a work-for-hire agreement to
Copyrightability of Annotations of Georgia’s Code, Venable LLP, (May 18, 2020),
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mitigate these issues and allow Lexis to retain its copyright.259 In the
future, if states wish to keep copyright protection on annotations, they
could allow the compiler to be the author of the annotation, who could
later assign or license the annotations to the state.260
Veeck stated in the Fifth Circuit that model building codes were not
copyrightable as they had become law after being the industry standard
for buildings in the municipality.261 Given how influential Veeck was in
the rationale for the Eleventh Circuit with this current expansion of
copyright law, copyright law may be expanded again to include model
building codes and other industry standards such as technical and
scientific standards which are later adopted into regulations and
laws.262
One notable developing lawsuit by the International Code Council
against Upcodes involves the publication of model building codes used
by architectural firms and contractors that were copyrighted but also
enacted into law.263 The International Code Council creates I-Codes
that are used as construction regulation for commercial and residential
buildings adopted in every U.S. state and some other countries.264
Upcodes is a database with building codes and construction regulations
that attempts to make this information available to its users.265
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Organizations that develop these technical standards often later
become adopted into state legislatures or Congress.266 These
organizations are often reliant on revenue gained from selling access to
these technical standards via books and subscriptions.267 Upcodes
affirms that these standards, through adoption by the state and federal
legislature, have become the law and should be accessible to the public,
motivated by the outcome of Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc.268
Upcodes also believes navigation of code requirements, transparency in
these regulations, and innovations within model codes and workflows
via algorithms can be realized if this information is accessible to the
public.269 As previously discussed, expectations that the public pay to
access regulations to which they are legally bound to follow goes against
the fundamental rights of the People.270
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. bodes similar to Fastcase, Inc. v.
Lawriter, LLC,271 a case where Casemaker sued Fastcase over
Fastcase’s publication of the Georgia Administrative Rules and
Regulations.272 Casemaker’s parent company has a contract with the
Georgia Secretary of State to be the exclusive publisher of Georgia’s
administrative regulations.273 Although Fastcase lost its case,
Fastcase’s CEO remarked how great of a decision Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc. was for public access.274 The Supreme Court’s
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decision certainly allows for lower courts to deem administrative
regulations uncopyrightable, in a benefit and deserved right for the
People.
V. CONCLUSION
While concerns exist as to the future of annotated versions and the
ability of legislators to orchestrate a deal in the facilitation of both their
and the American people’s interest, these concerns cannot work to
trivialize the desire and right of Americans to have full access to
annotations that, as explanatory legal materials, have such a direct
impact on their lives.275 In a nation where “ignorance of the law is no
excuse” and where the law is believed to belong to the People, holding
that these People do not have full access to this law-defining material
goes against the People’s right to fully understand their limits,
restrictions, and freedoms under the law. Access to the law and
information that holds great power in the law is necessary for the
protection of the People’s rights.276 With this holding, Georgia v.
Public.Resource.Org, Inc. secures this access for the People’s benefit.
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